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Introduction
Conventional wisdom argues that in the absence of altruism, an older generation may pay for the education of the following generation only if it can reap gains through social security bene¯ts or other forms of public expenditure. Konrad (1995) formalizes this argument by showing that even a gerontocracy controlled by the old may¯nd it optimal tō nance education for the young in order to boost social security tax revenue. Rangel (2000) developed a theory of intergenerational exchange for sel¯sh generations. He distinguished between intergenerational goods which are provided by the middle-aged to the young and those which are provided by the middle-aged to the old. He shows that a pay-as-you-go system may be self-sustainable if it generates a positive surplus for each participating generation. However, providing education for the younger generation is not sustainable without linking it into su±ciently big transfers to the old. If the surplus generated by the pay-asyou-go system and other goods provided by the middle-aged to the old does not exceed the costs of providing the education and other intergenerational goods that bene¯t the young, then the middle-aged would prefer to repudiate such an intergenerational contract.
If pay-as-you-go social security system were the only mechanism allowing public provision of education to survive, then privatizing social security would eliminate public provision of education. In a world of credit constraints or non-insurable risks, this could have dire consequences for future growth and welfare. In a world with full certainty and no credit market constraints, we would expect an e±cient level of private investment in human capi-tal. However, there are market mechanisms which may encourage the middle-aged to¯nance education for the young even in the absence of social security taxes or any other public expenditures bene¯ting the old. If the middle-aged have a stake in the future and the value of that stake depends on future human capital, the middle-aged may voluntarily invest in the younger generation. Boldrin (1994) presented a closed economy model in which the working generation accumulates physical capital, physical capital and human capital being technologically complementary. When the young would otherwise make an ine±ciently low educational investment, the middle-aged may collectively¯nd it rational to invest in the human capital of the following generation in order to increase the value of their physical capital.
Education provided for the young is essentially a public good bene¯ting all the middle-aged.
Public provision of education is used to avoid free riding. Boldrin and Montes (2000) generalize this insight by arguing that pay-as-you-go social security system may encourage e±cient human capital investment by increasing the stake that the current middle-aged generation has in future production. My paper argues that there exists a market mechanism which may render investment in human capital of the following generation pro¯table even without any market failure, and with internationally mobile¯nancial capital. This mechanism consists of market transactions of land.
1 Here land should be interpreted generally to incorporate all¯xed factors used in production. The middle-aged may want to invest in the young in order to receive a better price for land when they sell it to the following generation. While Konrad (1995) recognizes this mechanism in the discussion, it is not included in his model. Furthermore, in Konrad's model, public provision of social capital is¯nanced with taxes collected from the young later in the same period. In contrast, in this paper the middle-aged generation deciding on publicly provided education also¯nances it.
The introduction of land into an OLG framework generates the following new and surprising results. First of all, the middle-aged may want to provide public education even if the young would not face any credit market constraints, and could¯nance their education themselves. The old may voluntarily overinvest in the young even when they cannot tax any of the productivity increase. Secondly, it is possible that all welfare gains from establishing public education accrue to the generation which pays for education twice, once for itself and then for the subsequent generation. Numerical analysis suggest that all the following generations lose. This result is in marked contrast with the intuitive expectation that the generation establishing public education without being able to tax any of the bene¯ts through a social security system would be made worse o®. Thirdly, an intergenerational contract relying on a voluntary provision of a good for the next generation may under certain conditions be a bad equilibrium for the steady state generations. Rangel's (2000) results suggest that voluntary intergenerational transfers may survive only if they produce a surplus for all participating generations. He also argues that the middle-aged would always repudiate even an e±cient social contract under which they invest in the following generation without receiving any transfers back. According to Konrad (1995) , there may be an overinvestment in social capital by the older generation. The older generation chooses social capital investment to maximize tax revenue from the young net of investment costs. Cooley and Soares (1999) construct a model in which a pay-as-you-go system can be adopted as a voting equilibrium among generations in a closed economy. The middle-aged and old generations consider the contributions they have made as sunk costs.
My paper di®ers from these earlier contributions in that resources are voluntarily transferred from an older to a younger generation without any transfers back from the younger to the older generations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the laissez-faire solution. There are no e±ciency or welfare motivations for public investment, implying that the laissez-faire outcome is Pareto e±cient. Section 3 analyzes the conditions under which the middleaged prefer to¯nance education publicly. Game theoretically, the economy is depicted as a repeated game with overlapping generations of players in the spirit of Kandori (1991) , Salant (1992) , Smith (1992) , Boldrin and Montes (2000) and Rangel (2000) . As in Rangel (2000) , the provision of education is assumed to rely on a trigger strategy. Each middle-aged generation assumes that if it would repudiate from providing public education, then all the following middle-aged generations would also repudiate, and the economy would end up in a laissez-faire equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes political decision-making when labor is mobile.
Section 5 concludes. Production combines land and human capital supplied by the middle-aged. All individuals can borrow and lend internationally at a constant world interest rate. The time structure inside a period is as follows:
1. Production takes place. The middle-aged supply their labor inelastically.
2. The middle-aged receive their marginal product as their wage income, and the old receive the income accruing to land. The middle-aged pay back the loan that they have taken as young. The young take a loan.
3. The old sell land to the middle-aged. They pay back the loan taken (receive back the savings made) when they were the middle-aged. The middle-aged decide on their net saving for the old age.
4. The young complete their education and pay for it using the loan they have taken.
It is not essential to de¯ne at which point the young start investment in education.
Furthermore, production may also continue during latter parts of the period. The results are also insensitive to a change in which the old would sell land to the middle-aged before land receives its factor income. The timing of individual actions, except for consumption and saving decisions, is depicted in Figure 1 . The timeline is divided into three periods corresponding to youth, middle age, and old age. Production in period t, Y t , is determined by a Cobb-Douglas function combining human capital in the economy in the respective period, H t , and land. The amount of land is normalized at unity. Formally,
in which ®; 0 < ® < 1; is the elasticity of production with respect to human capital, and also the share of production accruing to human capital.
Human capital of a representative individual, h t , is equal to H t as cohort size is normalized at unity. Human capital of an individual in period t depends on that individual's educational investment in period t ¡ 1. Educational investment e consists of inputs whose price is normalized at unity. Production function of human capital is, dropping individual-speci¯c subscript,
in which 0 <¯< 1 captures the assumption that the marginal productivity of educational inputs is diminishing.
The middle-aged have to wait for one period before they receive income from the ownership of land and the income from selling it to the following generation. The arbitrage requires that the return on the ownership of land equals the world interest rate, denoted by r. Therefore, the land value in period t, V t , is determined by:
Equilibrium under laissez-faire
Time indices are dropped, as in the steady-state equilibrium e t = e t+1 = e and therefore
The young individually choose their own educational investment. Each young individual takes the expected net return on human capital, denoted by ½, as given. Educational investment e is chosen to maximize:
with the¯rst-order condition
The left-hand side tells the net present value of return on marginal educational investment, whereas the right-hand side is the marginal cost. As there are no borrowing con-straints, investment is made in order to maximize net present value of wage income net of investment costs. Next, substitute
where h = e¯into the¯rst-order condition (2). This allows us to solve the individually optimal educational investment:
Note that the ownership of land has no e®ect on educational choices. The reason for this is that for each individual, perfect international capital market allows to separate decisions of investment in education from the intertemporal allocation of consumption. In the steadystate equilibrium, the price of land is
3. Public provision of education
The setting of intergenerational game
Under public provision of education, steps 1, 2 and 3 inside a period are the same as in the laissez-faire solution. The fourth step, however, reads now as:
4' The middle-aged vote on a lump-sum tax collected from themselves to purchase education for the young. The young voluntarily receive the education.
As all the middle-aged are identical, they agree on the lump-sum tax. The time structure is such that the middle-aged cannot commit to a given provision of human capital for the next generation before they purchase land from the old. 2 Other parts of the time structure could be changed without a®ecting the results as described in subsection 2.1. The timing of individual actions except for saving and consumption is depicted in Figure 2 .
Figure 2
Denote the¯rst period in which publicly provided education can take place by 0, and the lump-sum tax collected in period t by ¿ t .
3 Lump-sum tax ¿ t is equal to educational investment as there is no population growth. It is assumed that if public provision of education can be sustained in equilibrium, then there is an equilibrium tax rate b ¿ . 4 Starting from period t = 0, each middle-aged generation either deviates or adopts the following trigger strategy:
2 It is enough to assume that the middle-aged cannot commit to not purchasing more education for the young than they have declared beforehand. As the price that the middle-aged pay for the land turns out to be increasing in expected future human capital, it would be never in the interest of the middle-aged to claim before buying the land that they would invest more in human capital than they would actually do.
3 I have assumed that the possibility of publicly provided education becomes known only in the¯rst period when it can be established after the middle-aged have bought the land. In that sense, the introduction of taxation technology is an unpredicted shock to the model. 4 As there is no population growth or technological change, there is no reason to expect that the tax rate would change over time. In a growing economy, we would analyze an equilibrium path of tax rates over time. While this would make the analysis more cumbersome, it would not provide any additional insight.
If ¿ t 6 = b ¿ and ¿ t > 0, then the economy reverts in the following period to the laissezfaire equilibrium in which each generation purchases its own education in a non-coordinated manner. Lump-sum tax is restricted to be non-negative. If the middle-aged choose ¿ t = 0, then the economy immediately reverts to private educational investments by the young.
Equilibrium with public education
Let us¯rst assume that there exists a steady state equilibrium with publicly provided education. As cohort size is normalized at unity, human capital in the steady-state equilibrium with lump-sum tax b ¿ is given by b ¿¯. This allows to solve as the steady-state market price of land
When the initial generation decides on whether to switch to public education, it has already purchased land. Therefore, the price that it has paid for land is irrelevant for the choice of educational policy. Public investment in education is chosen to maximize the discounted sum of rental income and sale revenue of land in the next period, net of investment cost. As b ¿ can be sustained in equilibrium, the middle-aged generation of period 0 knows that future generations will choose the same level of taxation as they choose. Rental income in the following period is simply (1 ¡ ®)¿ ®¯. Therefore, ¿ is chosen to maximize
giving as the optimal choice:
The middle-aged of period 0 want to establish public provision of education instead of laissez-faire solution only if this increases their lifetime net income. A su±cient and necessary condition for this is derived in Appendix A. Appendix A proves also that this is a su±cient and necessary condition for the public provision to be sustainable in equilibrium. The results can be summarized as Proof. See Appendix A.
It also holds that
Proposition 2. Public provision of education leads to a bigger investment in education than in a decentralized solution.
Proof. The land value is increasing in human capital. As the laissez-faire solution is always available, a necessary condition for the middle-aged to provide education publicly is that it increases human capital su±ciently to increase the present value of lifetime income of the middle-aged net of taxes. ¤
The land value plays a role equivalent to the trigger strategy's role in Rangel (2000) .
In Rangel's model, the trigger strategy relies on transfers from the younger to the older generations. In my model, there is no need for transfers from the young to the old. Instead, the trigger strategy relies on decentralized and voluntary market transactions. If a middleaged generation deviates from the public provision of education to the following generation, then it would su®er a capital loss in the land value.
Numerical examples suggest that the internationally determined interest rate has to be very low to justify public provision of education. 5 This is not surprising as my results are derived using the extreme assumption that public provision does not o®er any e±ciency gains, 5 For example, for ® =¯= 1 2 the condition is r < 27 101 . If this would be accrued over 20 years, yearly interest rate should be less than 1:2 per cent. With only a 10 year delay between investment cost and trade in land, a yearly interest rate would still have to be less than 2:4 per cent.
and that the middle-aged generation¯nances education entirely without being able to tax any of its bene¯ts. Furthermore, assuming the Cobb-Douglas production function excluded the possibility that the share of production going to the land owners could be increased by increasing the stock of human capital, and there was no growth. Including a social security tax would increase the range of interest rates in which the middle-aged generation would nd it optimal to¯nance education. Furthermore even without social security taxes, the middle-aged generation may resort to the less expensive strategy of subsidizing educational investment only partially. However, these modi¯cations are not needed to prove that it may be in the interest of the older generations to engage in unilateral transfers to the younger generations.
The welfare e®ects of providing public education on future generations are not clear ex ante. On one hand, future generations are able to postpone the¯nancing of education from youth to middle-age, thereby saving the interest payment on investment. On the other hand, the resulting level of educational investments is not e±cient. Numerical analysis suggests that the establishment of public education lowers the utility of the current young and all future generations.
6 Therefore, there is no potential of intergenerational Pareto improvement through the establishment of public education. What is remarkable is that none of the steady state generations has an incentive to abolish the system of public education once established as proved in Appendix A.
Equilibrium with mobile labor
In this section, I analyze the implications of labor mobility on education policy. While lump-sum taxes, proportional taxes and public resources per student were equivalent policy variables with a constant population, this equivalence no longer holds with migration. For example, constant educational resources per young person over time imply changes in tax burden of the middle-aged workers when there is migration. Lump-sum taxes would imply that the percentage of wage income paid in taxes would be di®erent across native citizens and immigrants, if they have di®erent endowment of human capital. Therefore, lump-sum taxation is no longer just a simplifying technical assumption that it was in the previous section. To capture the fact that taxes are typically levied on income, I therefore de¯ne public policy in this section as a choice of wage-tax rate ¿ w . 7 In a steady state with a constant population over time, this would also imply constant educational resources per young person over time.
I have assumed that there are no migration costs, and that domestic and foreign human capital are perfect substitutes in production everywhere. Migration decisions take place at the beginning of the middle-age after education is completed. Migration decisions are 7 Time index is dropped for simplicity.
made under perfect foresight, so that individuals correctly anticipate post-migration human capital in di®erent regions and decisions that will be made concerning whether to provide education publicly. Migration decisions are made in order to maximize wage income net of taxes. Public policy a®ects migration decisions only through its e®ects on after-tax wage income. Arbitrage conditions imply that return on land ownership is the same everywhere, so that it does not play any role in migration decisions. The region analyzed is small in relation to the whole world and takes the after-tax return on human capital, e ½, as given.
The timing of individual actions except for saving and consumption in a laissez-faire region with private educational decisions is depicted in Figure 3 . With labor mobility, return on human capital in a laissez-faire economy is determined by
giving as post-migration human capital
With publicly provided education, the timing of individual actions except for saving and consumption is depicted in Figure 4 . With tax rate ¿ w , after-tax return on human capital is determined by
Note that post-migration human capital is independent of human capital produced in the economy, regardless of whether such investments are chosen by individuals or through publicly provided education. This implies Proposition 3. With labor mobility, the middle-aged never provide public education with decentralized taxation.
Proof. The land value depends on post-migration human capital. In the steady state it
< 0, implying that postmigration human capital is the smaller the higher the tax rate to¯nance public education.
This implies that establishing publicly provided education would lead both to a capital loss in land value and also to a decrease in income due to taxes. Therefore, it is pro¯table for the middle-aged in each region to abolish publicly provided education. ¤ Proposition 3 does not require that all regions would be identical. A su±cient condition is that all regions take net return on human capital as given, and human capital is perfectly mobile. Regions may di®er in population size, the amount of land, and even in production technologies. If regions are di®erent, then the middle-aged in those regions receiving migration may gain from allowing international migration, whereas the middle-aged in other regions are likely to be hurt. In a world consisting of identical regions, a transition from no-migration equilibrium to free labor mobility has the following e®ects:
Proposition 4. Allowing free mobility between identical regions which initially provide education publicly results in the abolishment of public education. The land owners at the time of liberalization lose as land values drop to a laissez-faire level. Steady-state production is decreased.
Proof. By proposition 2, public education implies increased human capital investment. As liberalization eliminates public education, it lowers both steady-state production and land value. If the old have not yet sold land to the middle-aged when the liberalization takes place, they bear the full loss. If liberalization takes place after land has been sold, then the middle-aged bear the loss. The middle-aged lose even when liberalization takes place before they have provided education publicly, and can therefore save the taxes by abolishing public education immediately. The reason for this is that if the net present value of the di®erence in land value would not exceed the cost of public education, then public provision would not be equilibrium, even without migration in the¯rst place. ¤
Conclusion
In this paper, I demonstrated that the intergenerational trade in land may have many e®ects on the provision of intergenerational goods. In a model without land, Rangel (2000) proved that voluntary intergenerational transfers can survive only if they generate a positive surplus for the old. I show that if there is intergenerational trade in land, the middle-aged may voluntarily provide education for the young even when they do not receive any transfers.
The provision of public education may be established solely in order to increase market value of land. Furthermore, the provision of public education may lead to excessive investment in human capital even when it does not change the actual share of production going to human capital.
Globalization may undermine public support for education in two di®erent ways. First of all, labor mobility restricts redistribution between di®erent groups, as demonstrated by Wildasin (1991) and many other authors. This paper shows that labor mobility eliminates the incentives for a middle-aged generation to provide education in order to increase the land value, as an increase in human capital would be diluted internationally. Secondly, this paper also suggests that international dispersion of the land ownership decreases national incentives to provide education for the following generation even when labor is immobile.
The smaller the share of land owned domestically, the less the middle-aged are prepared to pay in taxes in order to increase its market value.
While public provision of education turned out to be excessive in my simple model, it widely the land ownership is distributed inside an economy, the wider the support for investment in the following generation. In a globalized economy, investing social security wealth in domestic market may be justi¯ed in order to provide incentives for the older generation to invest in the younger generation. Therefore, even a funded social security system might be able to provide incentives to public investment in the human capital of the following generation, provided that such social security funds are invested in domestic market, and labor mobility is su±ciently low.
I analyze¯rst a deviation to ¿ = 0. This leads into the laissez-faire equilibrium. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, the middle-aged receive by (3) and (4) ( 1 leading to the most pro¯table deviation subject to ¿ d > 0 :
It is easy to show that substituting (A.4) into (A.3) leads into a smaller value than (A.2).
Therefore, the most pro¯table deviation is ¿ = 0, implying an immediate reversion to the laissez-faire equilibrium. Thus, public provision is preferred if the net present value of income given by (A.1) exceeds the laissez-faire outcome given by (A.2). This condition yields 
